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I. Introduction: The Great Game of Then and Now
In 1991, the world watched in shock and awe as the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) collapsed leaving the United
States as the winner of the forty-six year long Cold War.' As the
Newly Independent States of Eastern Europe and Central Asia
broke away from the Soviet Union, few paid attention.2 The only
concern for most major international players was that the USSR
was gone and that the face of international politics would be
changed forever.3 Almost no one noted the issues for each new
republic as they attempted to rise from the settling dust of the
USSR.4
At first, the new republics of Central Asia were unwilling or
unable to venture out from their relationship with the former
I For detailed explanations of the end of the Cold War, see generally JOHN LEWIS
GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY (2005) (analyzing the significant themes
permeating the Cold war); PAUL KENGOR, THE CRUSADER: RONALD REAGAN AND THE
FALL OF COMMUNISM (2006) (detailing President Ronald Reagan's personal role in
subverting the Soviet system of government); DON OBERDORFER, FROM THE COLD WAR
TO A NEW ERA (1998) (narrating the Cold War from 1983-1992); JOHN O'SULLIVAN, THE
PRESIDENT, THE POPE, AND THE PRIME MINISTER: THREE WHO CHANGED THE WORLD
(2006) (profiling President Ronald Reagan, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,
and Pope John Paul II and their roles in the fall of the Soviet Union); PETER SCHWEIZER,
REAGAN'S WAR: THE EPic STORY OF His FORTY-YEAR STRUGGLE AND FINAL TRIUMPH
OVER COMMUNISM (2002) (summarizing and analyzing the fall of the USSR and the
associated repercussions).
2 See NADIA DIuK & ADRIAN KARATNYCKY, NEW NATIONS RISING: THE FALL OF
THE SOVIETS AND THE CHALLENGE OF INDEPENDENCE 268-70 (1993) [hereinafter DIUK &
KARATNYCKY] (detailing the early years after the Soviet Union's 1991 collapse in which
U.S. policymakers were slow to recognize the problems facing former Soviet republics).
The Newly Independent States, a common nickname for all newly sovereign states
created at the fall of the USSR, include Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
3 See id.
4 See id.
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USSR, now the Russian Federation.' Unfortunately, the new
Russian establishment was struggling and unwilling to aid its
neighbors.6 Inflation soared and national incomes plummeted
throughout Central Asia.' Quickly, the five countries of Central
Asia-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Turkmenistan-took steps to either further establish ties with
Russia or to seek aid from external sources.
Central Asians are used to the presence of external forces. For
the majority of the nineteenth century, the British Empire and the
Russian Empire competed for supremacy in Central Asia.9 The
10,000 km trade route deemed "The Silk Road" between Europe
and Asia was well sought-after by the British and Russian
Empire. "0 British novelist Rudyard Kipling is attributed with
naming the century-long rivalry "The Great Game.""
Today, games are once again afoot in the Eurasian Steppe.12
Like the "Great Game" of the nineteenth century there are multiple
players involved, with almost identical motives but competing
strategies.' Unlike "The Great Game," it is not Russia and Great
Britain competing for control; the United States, Russia, Europe,
and China are the most prominent figures.' 4 While control of the
5 See id. at 68-69 (asserting that a post-1991 exodus of relatively skilled ethnic
Russians and economic disparities had put nearly all of the Central Asian republics on
the path to economic dependence on Russian subsidies).
6 See id.
7 DIuK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at 68-69.
8 See 2 RUSSIA, THE CAUCASUS, AND CENTRAL ASIA: THE 2 1 " CENTURY SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT 10 (Rajan Menon et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter Menon et al.] ("Countries,
companies, and organizations from beyond are courting Central Asian states. The
rivalries that have emerged in this new zone of competition afford Central Asian
government many new opportunities."); see also DIUK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at
68-69.
9 See LuTz KLEVEMAN, THE NEW GREAT GAME: BLOOD AND OIL IN CENTRAL ASIA
2 (2003) [hereinafter KLEVEMAN].
10 Id. at 4.
11 Id. at 2.
12 The Eurasian Steppe is the area stretching from Hungary through Central Asia to
Manchuria. The Steppe Definition, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/565551/the-Steppe (last visited Feb. 7,
2011).
13 KLEVEMAN, supra note 9, at 3.
14 Id. at 4.
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region's goods is desirable, the major interests of the United
States, Russia, and China center around stability, security, and
energy."
II. The Second Transoceanic Era and How it has Changed the
Face of "The Great Game"
In 2007, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
(CSBA), a defense think tank in Washington, D.C., released a
report entitled A New Global Defense Posture for the Second
Transoceanic Era.'6 The report illustrates the characteristics of
the Second Transoceanic Era.17  While focused on the foreign
policy of the United States, the report touches on the specific
variables present in this "Era" that have not existed in any other."
Economically, the private sector now plays a much larger role
in influencing the actions of international players than was the
case a hundred years ago.' 9 Foreign policy has moved away from
the Monroe Doctrine, 20 "Big Stick" Diplomacy, 21 and the
15 See Assessing Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia: Hearing on H.R.
Before the Subcomm on Middle East and Central Asia, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) (statement
of Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman of Subcommittee) [hereinafter Assessing Energy
and Security Issues] (sketching the three interests as being interrelated).
16 See Andrew Krepinevich & Robert Work, A New Global Defense Posture for
the Second Transoceanic Era, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (2007),
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20070420.A New Global Defe
n/R.20070420.A NewGlobal Defen.pdf [hereinafter Krepinevich & Work].
17 The First Transoceanic Era is marked by the Cold War stretching from 1947
until the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Second Transoceanic Era is viewed as the period of
American transition to a new global defense scheme tailored to address the demands of a
post-Cold War world. See id. at i.
18 See id.
19 Compare Bilent G6kay, History of Oil Development in the Caspian Basin, in
OL AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE CASPIAN SEA REGION 10 (Michael P. Croissant & Bilent
Aras, eds., 1999) (detailing efforts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by the
Nobel and Rothschild families to explore Caspian oil fields and develop markets)
[hereinafter OIL AND GEOPOLITICS], with Vladimir Mesamed, Turkmenistan: Oil, Gas,
and Caspian Politics, in OIL AND GEOPOLITICS at 220-21 (describing a 1997 agreement
in which oil companies from more than a half-dozen nations-including Amoco, Exxon,
Shell, and Unocal, as well as state-backed firms from Turkey, Malaysia, and others-
agreed with Turkmenistan to rebuild a major oil refinery in Terkmenbashi, a Caspian
seaport).
20 The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 asserted that the Western Hemisphere was not to
be further colonized by European countries and that the United States would not interfere
with existing European colonies nor meddle in the internal concerns of European
420
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aspiration for an empire. 22 The Second Transoceanic Era is
characterized by the linkage of external policy interests with
domestic policy interests. 23 The report describes the "increasingly
important role" that strategic and operational concepts will play in
the Second Transoceanic Era. These concepts link the overall
posture with existing or emerging contemporary national security
challenges and the militaristic capabilities needed to address them,
forming the posture's "connective tissue."2 4
Central Asia is a region where its inner-workings have
significant domestic and foreign policy implications for the United
States, Russia, China, and the European Union. This Comment
will examine how the history, political turmoil, and natural wealth
of Central Asia have had a significant effect on the face of the
international community. Specifically, international law has
attempted to respond to the special issues that have arisen as the
states of Central Asia have gained their independence.
Central Asia is a region with a legacy shaped by centuries of
manipulation and neglect.2 5 Today, the region is exemplified by a
lack of national identity, a paranoid status quo left over from the
Soviet era, very little established infrastructure, and what some
believe is the world's last major untapped supply of oil and natural
gas.26
countries. Monroe Doctrine, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/390243/Monroe-Doctrine (last visited Feb.
7,2011).
21 "Big Stick" Diplomacy was Theodore Roosevelt's corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine of 1823, stating that the United States had the right to enforce "international
police power" over the Western Hemisphere. Big Stick and Dollar Diplomacy,
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3468300113.html (last visited
Feb. 7, 2011). "Big Stick" Diplomacy received its nickname from Theodore Roosevelt
in quoting the old African proverb, "Speak softly and carry a big stick, and you will go
far." Id.
22 See EUGENE RUMER ET AL., CENTRAL ASIA: VIEWS FROM WASHINGTON,
MOSCOW, AND BEIJiNG 7 (2007).
23 See Krepinevich & Work, supra note 16, at 19 (discussing the differences in the
American global presence between the First and Second Transoceanic Era).
24 Id.
25 See RUMER ET AL., supra note 22, at 7.
26 See KLEVEMAN, supra note 9, at 3.
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A. Overview of the Region
Kazakhstan, the most democratic of the Central Asian
countries, is the largest holder of natural oil wealth in the region
and has a somewhat "open-door" foreign policy. 27 Kyrgyzstan is
similar to Kazakhstan in its policies, but does not possess the same
natural fortune lying beneath its terrain.2 8 Uzbekistan has been
very closely tied to Russia since it ejected the U.S. military in
2005 from the Karshi-Khanabad airbase. 29 Tajikistan is still
crippled from its civil war in the early 1990s. 0 Tajikistan is in
such desperate need for external aid, it will partner with any
country willing to pay." Turkmenistan is still a mystery. The
country's longtime ruler, Saparmurat Niyazov died in December
2006 and was replaced by his Premier. 32 Naming himself
"Turkmenbashi" ("leader of all Turkmens"), Niyazov set forth
policies aimed at establishing a cult of personality-silencing
political opposition and independent media while naming cities
and calendar months after himself and his family-at the expense
27 See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Briefs -
Kazakhstan, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Kazakhstan/pdf.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2010) [hereinafter Country Analysis Briefs - Kazakhstan].
28 See U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Data and
Analysis for Kyrgyzstan,
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/countryenergy data.cfm?fips=KG (last visited Nov. 4,
2010).
29 See Krepinevich & Work, supra note 16, at 13 (describing the relationship
between Uzbekistan and the United States, specifically examining the termination of the
lease held by the U.S. in Uzbekistan).
30 See RUMER ET AL., supra note 22, at 49.
31 See Bess A. Brown, The Civil War in Tajikistan, 1992-1993, in TAJIKISTAN:
TRIALS OF INDEPENDENCE 95 (Mohammad-Reza Djalili et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter
Brown] (explaining the civil war's devastation of the Tajik economy, leaving the country
dependent on Russian aid); Assessing Energy and Security Issues, supra note 15
(statement of Ms. Lana Ekimoff, Director, Office of Russian and Eurasian Affairs, U.S.
Department of Energy) (explaining that Tajikstan has few natural resources other than
hydropower); KLEVEMAN, supra note 9, at 193 (citing Russian statements around 2003
that Russian peacekeeping troops would remain in Tajikistan for at least 15 more years);
David L. Stern, Fragile Tajikistan Hopes Water Will Power Its Ambitions, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2008, at A5 (reporting on a bilateral agreement with China to build a 300 million
dollars hydroelectric power plant).
32 See Turkmenistan's 'Iron Ruler'Dies, BBC NEWS (Dec. 21, 2006)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6198983.stm.
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of the liberty and well-being of his countrymen. 33  His deputy
premier, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, replaced him and has
attempted to undo Niyazov's policies, though some human rights
groups and other observers remain skeptical.3 4
B. International "Players" in Central Asia
The natural resources of Central Asia are a significant factor in
the policies of the United States, Russia, and China. Central Asia
has a very large supply of both natural gas and oil.35 With the
demand for energy resources increasing, the diversification of
energy sources is important to every global power." Energy
source diversity decreases the possibility that a few suppliers can
use their influence to incite a global conflict. Central Asia is
thought to be the final frontier in terms of natural resource
wealth.3 7 Some believe all other reserves have been found and
either tapped or abandoned due to complications with extraction.3 8
To ensure energy security in the region, the resources of Central
Asia need to be made available to the global market.
The United States' internal energy usage will not directly
benefit from the energy supplies of Central Asia, at least not to a
large degree.39 But, a loosening of Russia's grip on Central Asian
energy would mean a reduction of Russia's ability to use the
33 Id.
34 See Eye on Image, Turkmenistan Overhauls Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at
A7 (reporting on constitutional changes transferring power from a body of Niyazov-
picked delegates to an elected parliament).
35 See infra Section II.
36 See Press Release, Energy Information Administration, Projections Point to
Strong Growth in World Energy Use (Mar. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/press/pressl90.html.
37 See Brendan Murray, Cheney's Trip to Kazakhstan Takes Him to Oil's 'Final
Frontier, 'BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 3, 2006, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2067000 1 &sid=azwEKMhgsJk
[hereinafter Murray].
38 See John Leland, Imagining Life Without Oil, and Being Ready, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 2010, at A19.
39 See generally Bernard A. Gelb, CRS Report for Cong. on Caspian Oil and Gas:
Production and Prospects (Sept. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Caspian Oil and Gas] (explaining
how geopolitical, technological, and economic obstacles intertwine to block extensive
exploration and exploitation of the region's voluminous proven and unproven energy
reserves).
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supply to exert political pressure on its customers throughout
much of Europe. The establishment of an alternative Central
Asian pipeline system will help to make the countries in this
region "economically independent and by extension politically
independent and give them breathing space from Russia." 40
Finally, as the world's super power, the United States has an
interest and global responsibility to do everything possible in
preventing a global conflict, which is exactly what an energy-
monopoly in Central Asia, or any region for that matter, could
cause.41
Central Asia is the last known virtually untapped source of oil
and natural gas. 42 However, these countries are high-risk
environments for international investors.4 3 International law has
sought to catalyze Central Asian growth and establish a safer
investment atmosphere through instruments like the Energy
Charter Treaty.4 4
A splintering of Central Asia would mean disaster not only for
the region and its neighbors, but also for the United States,
Europe, Russia, and China.45 Disaster for major international
players will also result in catastrophe for the international
community as a whole. The success of any one power in this
region will be a significant indication of that power's geopolitical
40 Transcript of Panel Discussion hosted by the Council of Foreign Relations: The
Pursuit of Black Gold: Pipeline Politics On The Caspian Sea, 2, 18 (Nov. 13, 2007),
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/14861/pursuit-of blackgold.html
[hereinafter The Pursuit of Black Gold].
41 See Caspian Oil and Gas, supra note 39, at 1 (created by Bernard A. Gelb,
Specialist in Industry Economics, Resources, Science and industry Division).
42 See Murray, supra note 37.
43 See James P. Dorian & Eugene M. Khartukov, International Oil and Gas
Investment in the CIS States, in THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: AN EAST-WEST
GATEWAY OF INVESTMENT AND TRADE 40-49 (Thomas A. Walde, ed., 1996) [hereinafter
Walde & Dorian].
44 Discussed further infra Section 4.
45 Cf RUMER ET AL., supra note 22, at 6-7 (summarizing the political and economic
interests of the United States, Russia, and China, as well as those of India, Iran, Israel,
Pakistan, Turkey, multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations).
"What we have witnessed since 1991 is the demolition of the [Soviet] imperial edifice
and the emergence of multiple and multifarious horizontal lines connecting Central Asia
to regions to its west, south, and east." Id. at 8.
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future. 46 The United States must succeed in its Global War on
Terror. The United States hopes to establish ties between Iraq and
Afghanistan with a stable Central Asia in order to encourage and
ensure the long-term success of the War on Terror.47 Its ability to
establish a reliable military base in Central Asia is key to that
success. 48 The United States needs to be able to station a portion
of its military inside of Central Asia in order to be successful in its
Iraq and Afghanistan operations.4 9
For Russia and China, the countries of Central Asia are their
geographical backyards. '0 Russia enjoyed an unchallenged
dominance in the region until the fall of the USSR and the
formation of the Newly Independent States." China, a country
with enormous growth, envisions Central Asia as a new trade
market in which it can exercise power without having to actively
ensure the success of the region.52 The clash of internal and
external interest, plus the differing and often conflicting strategies
of the external players, has created a highly volatile atmosphere
within Central Asia.
III. The History of Central Asia
By examining how Central Asia was formed and its historical
relations with Russia, it is easier to understand the current state of
affairs and factors that complicate the power struggle taking place.
This section provides a history of Central Asia from the formation
of the USSR to the fall of the Soviet Union. It also describes the
46 See id.
47 Id.
48 See Svante E. Cornell and Niklas L.P. Swanstrom, The Eurasian Drug Trade: A
Challenge to Regional Security, 53 PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNIsM 10, 24 (2006),
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/2006/0608Eurasiandrugtrade.pdf.
49 See Krepinevich & Work, supra note 16, at 13.
5 See RUMER ET AL., supra note 22, at 61. "Central Asia is the strategic backyard
of every major power of Europe and Asia." Id.
51 See id. at 77-79.
52 See The Pursuit of Black Gold, supra note 40, at 8 (statement by Evan A.
Feigenbaum, Deputy Assistant Secretary For South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S.
Department of State). "The Chinese are dropping hundreds of millions of dollars of soft
money into places like Tajikistan. And when I say soft money, I mean no-strings
loans. And the loans are for good things. The loans do things like build infrastructure
and highways and tunnels." Id. at 8.
2011] 425
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
internal instability in each Central Asian state, another factor that
must be understood in order to fully comprehend the multifaceted
nature of the power struggle occurring on Central Asian soil.
A. Formation of the USSR through the Cold War
Central Asia is currently defined as the five sovereign states of
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and
Kyrgyzstan.53 From the 1910s until 1991, they were absorbed into
the Soviet Union.54 Prior to the Soviet era, mostly nomadic Turkic
tribes inhabited the territories." The czars badly abused their
"nomadic neighbors." 56 Like the leaders of most empires,
Russians saw Central Asia as a rich territory overrun with inferior
inhabitants."
During the Communist era from 1917 to 1991, the Soviet
Republic's attitude toward the five republics of Central Asia was a
unique form of colonialism, which displayed neglect in some
areas, and nepotism in others." Unlike the USSR's Slavic states 59
who played a more closely tended and publicly featured role,
Central Asia was used for its resources but saw very few of the
privileges promised by the new Soviet rulers. 60  The general
strategy of the Soviet Union toward Central Asia was to divide
and conquer.6 1
Economically, the Soviet Union was very irresponsible in its
treatment of Central Asia. "It saw Asia as 'a sleeping giant,
awakened' and in need of Soviet education." 62 Central Asia and
53 See RUMER ET AL., supra note 22, at 3.
54 See Menon et al., supra note 8, at 8.
55 See Seymour Becker, The Russian Conquest of Central Asia and Kazakhstan:
Motives, Methods, Consequences, in CENTRAL ASIA: ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AND
FUTURE PROSPECTS 23 (Hafeez Malik, ed., 1994) [hereinafter Becker].
56 Id.
57 See DIuK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at 43 (quoting Soviet Premier Mikhail
Gorbechev as admitting to reporters in 1988 that the region had been "neglected for a
long time by the Soviets.").
58 See id.
59 Such as Belarus and Ukraine.
60 See Becker, supra note 55, at 23.
61 See DIuK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at 41.
62 Stephen Blank, Soviet Reconquest of Central Asia, CENTRAL ASIA: ITS
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 41 (Hafeez Malik, ed., 1994)
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the Slavic republics provided a buffer zone for Moscow against
both the West and the East. 63 Remembering the trauma of
invasions by Napoleon and Hitler, and conveniently forgetting the
far more frequent, successful and long lasting imperialism of the
czars, the Soviets were determined to be impenetrable.6 4 In order
to achieve its security goals, the USSR believed that it needed to
be an intensely united territory. 65 Therefore, any form of
resistance was eliminated by this territorial unity.6 6
Attempting to create a homogenous population, the Soviet
Union used a process, borrowed from czarist Russia, that has since
come to be known as "Russification."" "'Russification' of the
heterogeneous population of the Czar's subjects thus represented a
violent, conscious welding of two opposing political orders, one
ancient, one quite new."6 8
The territories were carved into republics, creating the modem
states of today that are identified as Central Asia.69 People were
separated in order to make it impossible for them to form factions
and politically mobilize. 0
The local communist governments were as corrupt as the main
body of the government in Moscow. " Basically, local
governments were given the illusion of responsibility in order to
pacify the "natives," while Moscow reaped all of the profits.72
[hereinafter Blank].
63 See generally RUDYARD KIPLING, KIM (Macmillan & Co., 1901) (popularizing
the term "Great Game" into mainstream culture and discussing Central Asia's
importance in the future of Russia).
64 See RUMER ET AL., supra note 22, at 77-78.
65 See, e.g., DIuK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at 17-21 (describing efforts by the
Soviet government to promote the Russian language as a means of binding the nations of
the Union together); see also Blank, supra note 62, at 42-47 (describing the Soviet view
of Islam, the dominant religion of Central Asia, as being chauvinistic).
66 See id.
67 See DIuK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at 50.
68 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 86 (1991) [hereinafter
ANDERSON].
69 DIuK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at 179 ("[T]he borders of republics were
drawn by Stalin primarily to promote political expediency.").
70 See id. at 178.
71 See id.
72 Id.
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Government roles were given mostly to Russian Soviets, though
occasionally they were given to rival clan members to further
separate and antagonize the ethnic groups of Central Asia." As a
result of being governed by uncaring political elite, the major
problems in Central Asia-such as a lack of urbanization, rampant
disease, and an incredibly high infant mortality rate-were
ignored. 4
By the 1980s, the percentage of people living below the
poverty level, defined as earning less than 100 U.S. dollars a
month, was above thirty percent in all five Central Asian
Republics.75 In Turkmenistan it was higher than fifty percent.76
The economic, cultural, and political projects of the Soviet Union
had failed.77 The USSR's mismanagement of Central Asia would
prove to be a major factor in the empire's eventual demise.
The period between the 1970s and the eventual fall of the
USSR in 1991 was fraught with friction and change. This period
saw the rise of Nationalist parties within the Central Asian
Republics, a process that was accelerated by the more open
policies of Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev after 1985.'" Both
would contribute to the secession of the Central Asian Republics
from the Soviet Union.79 The rise of Nationalist parties among the
republics was a long time coming. It began in the 1920s, but the
Russian Security Forces, including the KGB, " and the Sixth
Detachment of the Internal Affairs Department, proved to be very
effective in arresting and detaining any opposition forces within
the Soviet Union."' They were later found responsible for having
detained millions of non-Russian prisoners, who were arrested for
73 See id.
74 See DIUK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at 45-49.
75 See Anderson, supra note 65, at 186.
76 See id.
77 See DiuK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at 42.
78 See id. at 4.
79 See, e.g., id. at 57-59 (arguing that Gorbechev's policy of glasnost, or
"openness," brought to light the inequities suffered by non-Russians of the USSR).
80 The Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti [hereinafter KGB] was the national
security agency of the Soviet Union from 1954 until 1991. See generally JOHN DZIAK,
CHEKISTY: A HISTORY OF THE KGB (Lexington Books, 1988).
81 see THE EMERGENCE OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN PoucY 51-66 (Leon Aron & Kenneth
Jensen, eds., 1994) [hereinafter Aron & Jensen].
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conspiring to incite riots.82
The real reason for most of the arrests was to aid Moscow in
separating the ethnic tribes, as well as to break the will of anyone
who opposed the government by forcibly moving possible leaders
to other areas." The Central Asia population began to understand
that it was at a "profound cultural, economic, educational, and
social disadvantage"8 4 in a way that it never had before. At the
same time, the new opportunities of the late 1980s also began to
dawn on the region. Local parties were gaining a larger
percentage of the vote in each Republic." The rise of Mikhail
Gorbachev in 1985 could not have come at a better time for the
Central Asian Republics or at a worse time for Moscow.
Gorbachev was the new face of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU). He traveled throughout the Soviet Union
and realized that his country was dying a slow and very painful
death. The economy was pathetic, unemployment was at an all
time high, and alcoholism was rampant.86 Gorbachev concluded
that in order for Russia to survive, Soviet workers had to become
more productive." His answer was to give them more freedom so
that they would be more motivated to work." His two-part plan
consisted of a new economic strategy, perestroika, and a new
political strategy, glasnost.8 9 Essentially, the economy would
move toward being market-based and parties other than the
Communist Party would be allowed to participate in the
government. 90 The latter process originated in the former Soviet
Republics, excluding Russia.91
82 See id.
83 See DiuK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at 42.
84 Id.
85 See Aron & Jensen, supra note 81, at 85.
86 See id. at 196.
87 See Isaac J. Tarasulo, Economic Reforms: Introduction, in GORBACHEV AND
GLASNOST: VIEWPOINTS FROM THE SOVIET PRESS 73 (Isaac J. Tarasulo ed., 1989)
[hereinafter Tarasulo].
88 See id.
89 DIUK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at 4.
90 See Gorbachev's Reform Dilemma, COUNTRY STUDIES,
http://countrystudies.us/russia/18.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011); Tarasulo, supra note
87, at 73.
91 See Tarasulo, supra note 87, at 11.
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The results of glasnost and perestroika in the Central Asian
Republics were not exactly what Gorbachev expected. While the
Turkic Soviets were motivated by these developments, they were
not motivated in a direction that was useful in preserving the
Soviet Union.92 Protests broke out across Central Asia during the
mid-1980s. 9 In Kazakhstan, students and young workers
swarmed Brezhnev Square to protest the removal of a local
Kazakh leader from the republic's top position.9 4
By 1990, "[g]eneral strikes motivated by a rising tide of
nationalism became a regular feature on the Soviet landscape.""
While Central Asians yearned for a national identity, never having
possessed any other than the one handed to them by the Soviet
Union, they struggled to find a set of common goals or
characteristics to define themselves by.96 Civil conflicts broke out
in Uzbekistan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and
Kyrgyzstan.9 ' The majority of these conflicts exacted a small
death toll, but the reaction of the Soviet troops after the conflicts
came at a much greater cost. Hundreds of civilians were
slaughtered in the name of repressing the popular fronts and
independence groups.98 This bloodletting only fueled the new
nationalist parties and reinforced the feelings of abuse among
Central Asians.99 However, even with all of the ill feelings Central
Asians had for Moscow and the CPSU, the Republics of Central
Asia were shocked and without directives as to how to proceed as
sovereign entities when the empire collapsed in 1991.'" The new
sovereign states of Central Asia seemed to have no idea about
what path they should take, and suddenly found themselves
92 See Hafeez Malik, Central Asia's Geopolitical Significance and Problems of
Independence: An Introduction, in CENTRAL ASIA: ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AND
FuTuRE PROSPECTS 8 (Hafeez Malik ed., 1994). Gorbachev's policy "transformed
suppressed nationalism in the empire into revolutionary struggle for self-determination."
Id.
93 See DIUK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at 8.
94 See id. at 10.
95 Id. at 9.
96 See id. at 17.
97 See Brown, supra note 31, at 86; DIuK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at 8-9.
98 See DIUK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at 9.
99 See id. at 9-11.
100 See id. at 262.
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scrambling to maintain a relationship with Russia and the rest of
the former Soviet states."o'
B. Independence and Internal Instability
Since the collapse of the USSR, Central Asian states have been
plagued by instability. With a history largely based in clan life, a
newly appointed and very inexperienced leadership, and the
potential for untold amounts of wealth, Central Asia has become a
hot spot for civil war, autocracy, and government-sponsored
repression.102 Frightened by the historical divisions within each
country based on clan membership and the growing Islamic
fundamentalist movements in neighboring countries, such as Iran,
Iraq and Afghanistan, leaders in Central Asia have turned into
dictators under the guise of maintaining stability at all costs."o3
Unfortunately, that kind of "artificial, temporary stability often
ends in explosive unrest." 104 Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and
Kyrgyzstan have all been particularly affected by internal conflict.
Tajikistan's troubles began at the very beginning of its
independence. The winter of 1992 was characterized by a heated
civil war between the government dominated by the Kulyabi, a
traditional clan of Tajikistan, and the United Tajikistan Opposition
(UTO).o The UTO was made up of the other clans of Tajikistan
which felt oppressed during the Soviet era.'06 The Kulyabi clan
dominated during the Soviet era and would dominate after
independence as well. Basically, the conflict was not over
ideology but control. The actual civil war was over by May 1992;
however skirmishes still broke out consistently until 1998.107 The
government of Tajikistan had a very narrow base of followers and
its authority was only legitimized by its control over the majority
101 See id. at 263.
102 See id. at 260-62.
103 See DIUK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at 260-62.
104 Unstable Autocracies in Central Asia, N.Y. TIMEs at A20 (Mar. 5, 1999),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/05/opinion/unstable-autocracies-in-
central-asia.html.
105 Brown, supra note 31, at 88-93.
106 See id. at 86-97.
107 See id.
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of the country's wealth.'08
In 1994, the United Nations (UN) intervened, facilitating peace
talks until 1998, when an agreement was finally reached between
both sides.'09 During the four years between the UN's arrival and
the agreement, there were thousands of casualties among Tajiks."o
Finally, in 1998, fueled by the Taliban's capture of Kabul during
the previous September, the UN forced an agreement between the
Tajik government and the UTO. "' The agreement allowed
President Emomalii Rahmon to retain his presidential powers
while acting in consultation with the Commission on National
Reconciliation headed by UTO Chairman Said Abdullo Nuri." 2
Tajikistan is unlike its neighbors in that it has no vast supply of
natural gas or oil and must rely on its own economy and the aid of
others to survive.1" A silver lining for Tajikistan would be the
possible transit of some of its neighbors' natural wealth through its
territory, perhaps giving the country an opportunity to exact some
sort of transit fee."14
The internal conflict within Kyrgyzstan, the Tulip Revolution,
occurred more recently in 2005."' In 1991, Askar Akayev was
named President of Kyrgyzstan." 6 While a former member of the
Soviet leadership, Akayev was seen as the most democratic new
leader in Central Asia."' He introduced multi-party democracy
108 See Tajikistan Civil War, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (Nov. 1, 2010),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/tajikistan.htm.
109 See id.
110 See id.
III See id.
112 See id.
13 See Tajikistan Energy Profile, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION AGENCY (Nov. 1,
2010), http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country energydata.cfm?fips=TI. Tajikistan is
ranked 7 1St in the world for proven oil reserves and 8 2 nd for proven natural gas reserves.
Id.
114 See Tajikistan: Energy, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (Nov. 1, 2010),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/centralasia/tajik-energy.htm.
115 See Pepe Escobar, The Tulip Revolution Takes Root, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (Mar.
26, 2005), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/CentralAsia/GC26AgO3.html [hereinafter
Escobar].
116 See Profile: Askar Akayev, BBC NEWS (Apr. 4, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4371819.stm [hereinafter BBC NEWS).
117 See Escobar, supra note 115.
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and looked to many intergovernmental organizations like the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for aid."' The
United States created "170 non-governmental organizations
charged with development or promotion of democracy,"" 9 in
Central Asia. As most outsiders saw it, Kyrgyzstan would be the
Switzerland of Central Asia and Akayev was "hailed as an
advocate for an open and liberal atmosphere." 20
Unlike Tajikistan, Uzbekistan has not experienced a full-on
civil war, but internal conflicts have been rampant.121 On May 13,
2005, a massive anti-government protest was held in Andijan, a
city located in the most eastern part of the country very near the
Fergana Valley. 122 The day before the protest, twenty-three
prominent businessmen in the city had been jailed on unjust
charges of Islamic extremism, which has been allowed in most
Central Asian countries.123 On the morning of May 13, gunmen
broke the businessmen out of jail and gathered, along with 10,000
other protesters, in Bobur Square.124 The unarmed protesters were
peaceful and included both women and children.12 5 By midday,
government deployed tanks and armed soldiers surrounded the
square. 126 With no warning, the soldiers opened fire on the
protestors. 127 The government of Uzbekistan reported the
casualties at 187, with other sources claiming over 700. 128
"Reports later emerge[d] that injured people were summarily
118 See Kyrgyz Republic History, EXPLORE (Nov. 1, 2010),
http://www.iexplore.com/dmap/Kyrgyz+Republic/History (last visited Feb. 7, 2011);
Escobar, supra note 115.
119 Escobar, supra note 115.
120 BBC NEWS, supra note 116.
121 See JIM NICHOL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22161, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, UNREST IN UZB: CONTEXT AND IMPLICATIONS 3 (2005) [hereinafter NICHOL].
122 See How the Andian Killings Unfolded, BBC NEWS (May 17, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4550845.stm [hereinafter How the Andijan Killings
Unfolded].
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 See How the Andijan Killings Unfolded, supra note 122.
127 See id.
128 Uzbekistan, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, (Mar. 8, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61684.htm.
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executed."l29 The United States, which had a military base within
the country, demanded an external party conduct an
investigation. 13 0 The result was that while there was no external
investigation, the government of Uzbekistan revoked the United
States lease on their military base.' 31
Turkmenistan has been the starkest example of a dictatorship
in Central Asia almost since its independence. Former President
Saparmurat Niyazov, self-proclaimed "Turkmenbashi," or father
of the Turkmen, created a kingdom for himself.132 "He renamed
the month of January after himself and April after his mother; he
banned ballet, gold teeth, and recorded music; he ordered the
construction of a lake in the midst of the desert and a ski resort on
snowless foothills of the Iranian border." "' Niyazov built a
revolving gold statue of his likeness, similar to the statues of
Lenin, which revolves to face the sun. 134 The capitol of
Turkmenistan, Ashgabat, is covered in alabaster and gold, creating
a paradise in the middle of a desert.13 1
President Niyazov died unexpectedly in December 2006 and
was replaced by his physician, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow. 136
Turkmenistan has until very recently been completely closed off to
all other parts of the world other than Russia. In fact, all of
Turkmenistan's natural gas exports have gone through Russia.
Since the induction of President Berdimuhamedow, there has been
more talk of opening the country. 13
129 How the Andian Killings Unfolded, supra note 122.
130 See Alexander Cooley, Base Politics, 84 FORIEGN AFF., 79, 88 (2005).
131 See Krepinevich & Work, supra note 16, at 13.
132 Lucy Ash, Dictator's: Central Asia's New Idol, NEWSTATESMAN (Sept. 4, 2006),
http://www.newstatesman.com/200609040034.
133 Id.
134 See id.
135 Ashgabat, Turkmenistan - The City of Love, UNCORNERED MARKET (Nov. 4,
2010), http://www.uncorneredmarket.com/photos/set/72157601499421590/page l/.
136 See Turkmenistan's 'Iron Ruler' Dies, supra note 29.
137 See Sergei Blagov, Russia Labors as Neighbors Do Deal, ASIA TIMES ONLINE
(Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/CentralAsia/KLl7AgO.html
[hereinafter Blagov] (pointing out the fact that Turkmenistan and China have made a
long term trade agreement for the exchange of natural gas).
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C How Important is Stability?
These conflicts create a unique problem for the external
players within Central Asia. The United States, Russia, China,
and Europe all have different strategies for dealing with the unrest
in the region. All have an interest in maintaining stability,
especially with regard to energy security.
IV. "The Devil's Tears":18 How many are there exactly?
In comparison with most of the Organization of Petroleum
Exploring Countries (OPEC), Central Asia possesses relatively
small amounts of oil and natural gas in terms of proven reserves.'39
However, as world demand continues to grow over the next
decade, the region will gain importance as various countries
diversify their resources of oil and gas beyond traditional suppliers
as the Middle East.'40 Developing resources in Central Asia will
prevent OPEC countries from driving up their trading prices,
ensuring that no one country or group of countries has the ability
to create an energy source conflict.'4 1 Until 1991, there was little
reason for anyone to have an interest in Central Asia. "By 1993,
most major oil companies in the world were present in the Caspian
region."42 Oil companies are not frivolous or irrational investors.
Therefore their initial rush to gain access to Central Asia, and their
continued investment in the region, is telling evidence of the
significance of the region.143
138 A commonly used nickname for oil. See, e.g., KLEVEMAN, supra note 9, at 1.
139 See Country Energy Profiles, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) [hereinafter
Country Energy Profiles]. The countries are ranked as follows in terms of proven
reserves for oil and gas in comparison with the rest of the world: Kazakhstan is ll in
proven oil reserves and 16'h for natural gas; Uzbekistan is 41st for oil and 15th for natural
gas; Turkmenistan is ranked 40' for oil and 14th for natural gas; Tajikistan is ranked 71st
for oil and 82nd for natural gas; Kyrgyzstan is ranked 66th for oil and 82nd for natural gas.
Id.
140 See generally Stephen Blank, The Strategic Importance of Central Asia: An
American Review, 38 PARAMETERS 73, 73-4 (2008) (discussing the diverging policies of
Russia, the United States, and Central Asia).
141 See Vlado Vivoda, Diversification of Oil Import Sources and Energy Security: A
Strategy or an Elusive Objective?, 37 ENERGY POL'Y 4615,4618 (2009).
142 lan Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: America's Relentless Drive for Energy 109
(2006).
143 See Steve Levine, Former Foreign Correspondent, Wall St. J., Panel Discussion
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The three major suppliers in the Central Asian region are
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 144 The subsequent
sections will examine each individually.
A. Turkmenistan
1. Natural Gas
Turkmenistan possesses the fourth largest reserve of natural
gas in the world with 100,000 billion cubic feet of proven gas
reserves within its borders. 145 Turkmenistan is also one of the
most underdeveloped of the Central Asian countries especially
with regard to its infrastructure for storing and transporting its
abundance of natural gas.146 Niyazov, former Secretary General of
the Turkmen Communist Party, maintained a close relationship
with Russia post-independence.147 With his death in December
2006 came the worldwide hope that Turkmenistan would begin to
open its energy sector to the international market.'4 8 "Obviously,
everybody-the United States, the European Union, Russia-
wants to try to get their foot in the door while there appears to be
before the Council on Foreign Relations: The Pursuit of Black Gold: Pipeline Politics on
the Caspian Sea: (Nov. 26, 2007). Mr. Levine commented that
Well, the American interests, the American policy in the region, actually goes
back to when the Berlin Wall came down and Gorbachev declared the Soviet
Union open for business and oil men from around the world -- American oil
men, and British, Italian, French -- rushed, having sat on the outside knowing
all of these reserves were inside the Soviet Union, the Wall has come down,
they rushed onto the Caspian Sea into Kazakhstan and Baku, and started trying
to do deals.
Id.
144 See Country Analysis Briefs - Kazakhstan, supra note 27; U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, Country Energy Profiles, supra note 139.
145 Turkmenistan Energy Profile, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/countryenergydata.cfn?fips=TX (last visited Nov. 2,
2010).
146 See Turkmenistan - Infrastructure, Power, and Communications, ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE NATIONS, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Asia-and-the-
Pacific/Turkmenistan-INFRASTRUCTURE-POWER-AND-
COMMUNICATIONS.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
147 See John C.K. Daly, Analysis: Turkmenistan, Russia, and China, ENERGY TECH
(Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.energy-daily.com/reports/AnalysisTurkmenistanRussia_
andChina_999.html.
148 See id.
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some sort of opening."l 49 Turkmenistan has held a foreign policy
of positive neutrality since independence and President
Berdimuhamedow has already stated that he intends to continue
this policy.'
The two major gas fields in Turkmenistan are Dauletabad and
Shatlyk."' Two other fields have been discovered, though their
estimated reserves have not been confirmed. 15 2 The Dauletabad is
hoped to be the future starting point for the Trans-Afghan
Pipeline, which will run from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan,
and into Pakistan.' The three largest investors that have made
deals with Turkmenistan since its independence are Russia's
Gazprom, Argentina's Bridas, and the United States' Unocal.154
Gazprom has had the most success with Turkmenistan due to
Russia's history of dominance within the region and the fact that
the entire country's infrastructure for natural gas transportation
leads north to Russia.155
Beginning in 1999, Russia and Turkmenistan signed a long-
term supply agreement that insured that the majority of the
Turkmen gas export would go to Russia."' While a small dispute
over price stopped production in 2004, Turkmenistan increased its
pledge from 212 bcf (billion cubic feet) in 2005 to 2.4 tcf (trillion
149 C.J. Chivers, Turkmenistan Hails Leader and New Era After Election, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/15/world/asia/15turkmenistan.html.
150 See id; FY 2007 U.S. Assistance to Eurasia, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, (January
2008), http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/eurasiafy07/ll5982.htm.
151 See Gawdat G. Bahgat, Exporter Updates: Azerbaian, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan, 107 OIL & GAS J. 23, 23-24 (Jun. 2009) [hereinafter Bahgat].
152 See id. ("In the mid-2000s the supergiant South Yolotan-Osman was discovered
in the southeastern part of the country. In October 2008 an independent audit confirmed
that the field was among the world's biggest. In August 2008 another large field, South
Gutlyayak, was discovered.").
153 See Table 5: Natural Gas Export Routes and Options in the Caspian Sea Region,
Table in Caspian Sea Region: Reserves and Pipeline Tables, ANGELFIRE (Nov. 2, 2010),
http://www.angelfire.com/dragon/asif/CaspianSea Region.htm.
154 See Timeline of Competition between Unocal and Bridas for the Afghanistan
Pipeline, WORLDPRESS.ORG (Nov. 4, 2010),
http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/pipeline timeline.htm.
155 See Bahgat, supra note 151, at 24.
156 See id.
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cubic feet) in 2007.' 1 However, "The Great Game" has not been
won yet and foreign energy investors are courting Turkmenistan as
though their survival depends on it, which may be true in the long
run. Turkmenistan has been exporting natural gas to Iran since the
1990s "' and has recently extended its existing agreement with
China. 159
2. Oil
The oil reserves held within Turkmenistan are believed to
contain anywhere between 546 million barrels and 1.7 billion
barrels. 160 The majority of the oil fields are located in the South
Caspian Basin in the west of Turkmenistan. 61  Turkmenistan's
troubles in its oil sector are two-fold. First, like its natural gas
supply, the oil supply lacks foreign investment due to the
country's isolation over the past decade and consequential
deficiency in infrastructure. 162 Second, the majority of
Turkmenistan's oil lies either on the shore of or under the disputed
waters of the Caspian Sea.163 The five littoral states of the Caspian
Sea, Turkmenistan, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Kazakhstan,
have yet to come to an agreement about whether or not the
Caspian Sea is, in terms of international law, in fact a sea or a
lake.16 4 The continuing debate makes it difficult for Turkmenistan
157 See Energy Profile of Russia, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH (Oct. 30, 2008),
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile-of Russia.
158 Bahgat, supra note 151, at 24-25.
159 See Blagov, supra note 137.
160 See Tur/anenistan Energy Profile, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION
(last visited Feb. 7, 2011),
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/countryenergydata.cfm?fips=TX. The profile breaks
petroleum reserves by a thousand barrels per day to determine capacity.
161 See Energy Profile of Central Asia, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH (Sept. 4,
2008),
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energyprofileof CentralAsia#Turkmenistan.27sOil_
Sector [hereinafter Energy Profile ofCentral Asia].
162 See id.
163 See id.
164 See generally BAHMAN AGHAI DIBA, THE CASPIAN SEA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 26 (2003) (discussing the geographical classification of the Caspian Sea as a
lake, but the historical classification as a sea); Siamak Namazi & Farshid Farzin,
Division of the Caspian Sea: Iranian Policies and Concerns, in THE CASPIAN POLITICS,
ENERGY AND SECURITY 214 (Shirin Akinder ed., 2004) (identifying the existing
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and any foreign investor to develop the oil that lies under the
Caspian Sea.
B. Kazakhstan
1. Oil
Kazakhstan has been the most stable and consistently
successful of the Central Asian states since the Soviet dissolution.
Due to a large population of wealthy Russians in its capital in
Alma Ata, Kazakhstan was deemed the "most European of the
Commonwealth of Independent States."l 65 Having more of an
open door policy, Kazakhstan signed an agreement with the U.S.
oil company Chevron in 1992.166
Possessing two-thirds of the region's proven two million bbl/d
(billion barrels per day), Kazakhstan also has the most developed
infrastructure and economy for its energy sector. Its industrial
sector (primarily "extraction and processing of natural resources")
provides for about thirty percent of the country's GDP. 167 In 2007,
Kazakhstan was producing 1.44 million bbl/d of which only
240,000 bbl/d were used domestically. 168 It hopes to increase
production to 3.5 million bbl/d by 2015.169 The major oil fields in
Kazakhstan are the Tengiz field, the Karachaganak, and the
Kashgan.'o
The Tengiz field was the first to be developed by Chevron.171
definitions of a "sea" and a "lake"); Cynthia M. Croissant and Michael P. Croissant, The
Legal Status of the Capian Sea: Conflict and Compromise, in OIL AND GEOPOLITICS IN
THE CASPIAN SEA REGION 21-42 (Michael P. Croissant & Bilent Aras eds., 1999)
(explaining the conflict behind determining the legal status of the Caspian Sea and the
effect of that status on regional relationships).
165 DIUK & KARATNYCKY, supra note 2, at 200.
166 See Steven Greenhouse, Chevron to Spend $10 Billion to Seek Oil in
Kazakhstan, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1992, at Al.
167 Kazakhstan - Economic Sectors, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Asia-and-the-Pacific/Kazakhstan-
ECONOMIC-SECTORS.html.
168 See Kazakhstan Energy Profile, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION
(July 14, 2010), http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/countryenergydata.cfm?fips=KZ.
169 See Andrew Neff, Russian-Chinese Competition May Marginalize US, European
Influence, 104 OIL & GAS J. 39,40 (Mar. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Neff|.
170 See Country Analysis Briefs - Kazakhstan, supra note 189, at 1.
171 See id. at 2.
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It is located on Kazakhstan's northeastern shores of the Caspian
Sea.172 It holds between six and nine billion barrels and will
hopefully be producing up to one million bbl/d by 2012.' The
majority of the oil extracted from Tengiz is transported through
the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). 174 The CPC was
established by Chevron in congruence with several other major oil
companies, and the government-owned Kazmunaigaz and
Oman.' The oil is transported through the pipeline from Tengiz
to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. 17 6 At first, Russia
would not allow oil to be pumped through its territory, but in the
end the Russian Federation joined the Consortium and exacted a
land-use tariff. 17 The Tengizchevroil joint venture is broken
down as follows: Chevron/Texaco at fifty percent, ExxonMobil at
twenty-five percent, Kazmunaigaz at twenty percent, and LukAcro
at five percent.'17  The development of this field is the perfect
example of a successful development of Central Asia's resources.
Karachaganak is located on the northern shores of
Kazakhstan's Caspian Sea territory.19 In 2007, the output of the
field increased to over 250,000 bbl/d.'" A smaller pipe has been
built that connects the Karachaganak field with the CPC,
bypassing Orenburg field, which is Russian-owned, and reducing
172 See id.
173 See id.
174 See id. at 4.
175 See Adrian Dellecker, Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Bellwether of
Russia's Investment Climate?, RUSSIE.NEI.VSIONS, June 2008, at 1, 10, available at
http://www.ifri.org/files/Russie/ifi-RNVDellecker CPCENG juin2008.pdf
[hereinafter Dellecker].
176 See Country Analysis Briefs - Kazakhstan, supra note 27, at 4.
177 See Dellecker, supra note 175, at 12.
178 Kazakhstan Country Analysis Brief Oil, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION (Nov. 22, 2010),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Kazakhstan/Oil.htm.
179 Oil and Gas Industry in the Republic of Kazakhstan, PETROLINVEST (Nov. 8,
2010),
http://www.petrolinvest.pl/en/przemysl-naftowy-i-gazowy-w-republice-
kazachstanu.html.
180 EJA Kazakhstan Oil, SILK ROAD INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 10, 2008),
http://silkroadintelligencer.com/2008/01/10/eia-kazakhstan-oil [hereinafter EIA
Kazakhstan Oil].
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dependence on Russian consumers.
The Kashagan oil field is the prize jewel of Kazakhstan.182 It
is "the largest known oil field outside the Middle East, and the
fifth largest in the world in terms of reserves."' Located off of
the northern shore of the Caspian Sea, its reserves have been
estimated around thirteen billion barrels. 184 It also has a large
reserve of natural gas, the volume of which has yet to be
determined. It has been developed by another consortium, the
Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company, which was
replaced by a new company in 2009. ' Unfortunately, the
development of this field requires overcoming several obstacles.
There are several environmental issues,' as well as consideration
of the extreme weather fluctuations of the area. Most of all, the
new "rent tax" introduced by the Kazakh government in 2004 has
made some of the investors skeptical. 1' The new tax gives
Kazmunaigaz the power to tax exports progressively according to
the rise of oil prices.' Additionally, "the new structure includes
an excess profit tax, and limits foreign participation to fifty
percent in each offshore project with no guarantees of
operatorship."' 8 9 Finally, any oil that Kashagan produces "will
require a completion of the existing BTC pipeline" in addition to a
new treatment plant.'90 They hope their output will reach 300,000
181 See id.
182 See id.
183 Country Analysis Briefs - Kazakhstan, supra note 27, at 3.
184 See id.
185 See id. The consortium includes ENI (Italian oil company), ConocoPhilips,
Exxon Mobil, Inpex, Kazmunaigaz, Shell, Total. Id.
186 See id. The field is also rich with natural gas and the oil refinery process is much
more involved due to high sulfur content in the oil. Due to all of the issues with the
development of this field, the start date for production has been pushed back to 2014. Id.
187 See EJA Kazakhstan Oil, supra note 180. Kazakhstan's subsoil development
policy poses a threat to foreign investors. "The new law, effective in November 2007,
gives Kazakhstan two paths to terminate contracts with energy companies. One option
forces the company into negotiations with the government, and the other option allows
for the repudiation of the contract with a notice period of only two months." Id
188 See id.
189 Energy Profile of Kazakhstan, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH (Dec. 15, 2007,
7:52 PM), http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energyprofile_ofKazakhstan#gen6
[hereinafter Energy Profile ofKazakhstan].
190 EJA Kazakhstan Oil, supra note 180.
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bbl/d within the next decade, while the total costs are expected to
reach $136 billion, up from the initial $57 billion Kazakh sources
first thought the project would require.19 '
2. Natural Gas
Kazakhstan's proven reserves stand between 65 and 100 tcf.19 2
However, until 1999, the majority of this went untouched. New
legislation introduced in August 1999 urged any "sub-soil users,"
i.e. oil companies, to also research and develop natural gas
projects. The government hopes to increase their natural gas
production to 900 bcf by 2012.194 Karachaganak is where the
majority of Kazakh's natural gas is found.195 The majority of the
natural gas found in Kazakhstan is associated with the oil that is
found there.'9 6 This is both a blessing and a curse. This type of
gas can be reinjected into the ground and recovered when the
liquid sources are exhausted.'97 However, this procedure causes
flaring, which can be very dangerous and a waste of the natural
resource.'" Flaring occurs when an excess of natural gas leaks out
and is purposely burned off.'99 The Tengiz field consortium has
developed the Sour Gas Reinjection Project in response to the
excessive flaring they experienced in 2005, which caused it to
completely shut down its energy generators.2 00
Like the oil produced in Kazakhstan, the natural gas must also
be exported through a series of pipelines.2 0' In 2005, Kazakhstan
and the Chinese CNPC (oil company owned by the Chinese
government) signed an agreement to construct a gas pipeline from
'9' Id.
192 See Energy Profile ofKazakhstan, supra note 189.
193 See id.
194 See Country Analysis Briefs: Kazakhstan, supra note 27, at 5.
195 See id.
196 See Energy Profile ofKazakhstan, supra note 189.
197 See id.
198 See id.; see also Global Gas Flaring Estimates, NATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL DATA
CENTER (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/dmsp/interest/gas-flares.html
[hereinafter Global Gas Flaring Estimates].
199 See Energy Profile ofKazakhstan, supra note 189.
200 Id
201 See Country Analysis Briefs: Kazakhstan, supra note 27, at 5, 6.
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Atasu to the Alashankov district.20 2 China agreed to finance the
project and is the primary buyer of all of the gas traveling through
it.203 In 2007, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan signed an
agreement to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to Russia
via the Central Asia Center Gas Pipeline. 204 Members are
responsible for constructing the section of the line within their
205territory.
C. Uzbekistan
1. Natural Gas
As one of the largest natural gas producing countries in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) second only to
Russia, Uzbekistan holds estimated reserves of 66.2 Tcf of natural
gas.206 With 52 developed fields, concentrated in the Amu Dar'ya
Basin and the Mubarek area, Uzbekistan is one of the top ten gas
producers in the world.20 7 Uzbekistan is similar to Kazakhstan in
that it has concentrated on development since independence and
has been open to foreign investors other than Russia. 208 However,
Uzbekistan had some issues with investors over the years.
Beginning in 2001, Uzbekistan signed a "Production Sharing
Agreement" (PSA) with the British Trinity Energy group.2 09 PSAs
are common in Central Asia because of the high cost of
exportation and processing. The project's goal was to develop the
Ustyurt and Gissar fields with an annual production goal of 71 bcf
by 2006.210 Unexpectedly, in 2005 Uzbekneftgaz broke off the
202 International Cooperation, KAZMUNAYGAS (Sept. 11, 2010),
http://lang.kmg.kz/page.php?pageid=1017&lang=2.
203 See Olzhas Auyezov, Kazakhstan Starts Building Gas Pipeline to China,
REUTERS: UK EDITION (Jul. 9, 2008, 11:49 AM BST),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL0939802620080709 [hereinafter Auyezov, supra note
27, at 5.
205 See id.
206 See Energy Profile ofCentral Asia, supra note 161.
207 See id.
208 See id.
209 Id.
210 See id. Uzbekistan's nationally-owned gas company, Uzbekneftegaz, announced
in June 2008 that the dispute would be resolved outside of the international arbitration
court. See id.
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PSA stating that the Trinity Energy Group's subsidiary UzPEC
had not upheld certain parts of the 2001 agreement. 2 1' The issue
has yet to be resolved, and the Gissar field, which was shut down
in 2004, has yet to be re-opened.2 12
Added to this disagreement is the inability of the United States
to hold onto its military bases in Uzbekistan.2 13 It seems the
Western investors are having trouble holding onto their influence
in this Central Asian country. Where they have failed, China and
Russia have succeeded. Beginning in 2004, Russia's Gazprom has
pledged significant funds to modernizing Uzbekistan's oil fields as
well as exploring new fields.214 China's CNPC signed a deal in
June 2005 to develop twenty-three new fields in conjunction with
Uzbekneftgaz. 2 15 This deal not only was profitable, but it was also
a message to the Western investors. While the United States and
other European countries publicly raged about the injustice of the
Andizhan massacre, China made a deal with Uzbekistan that
would allow them to be the sole benefactor of any natural gas
produced within some of China's largest sites.216
V. Pipeline Politics
The oil companies invented the pipeline in 1990, 1991,
1992. They already knew that the place was
landlocked. They needed to be able to get that oil
out. And on the back of envelopes and on napkins they
were drawing how are we going to do it. And a BP man
actually drew the first rendition of the Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline on a napkin, and he still has that napkin.2 17
A significant part of the "Great Game" in Central Asia is being
211 See Energy Profile ofCentral Asia, supra note 161.
212 See id.
213 See Nichol, supra note 121, at 5 (discussing the ejection of a U.S. Air base from
Uzbekistan in 2005).
214 See Energy Profile of Central Asia, supra note 161.
215 See Neff, supra note 169, at 39.
216 See id.
217 The Pursuit of Black and Gold, supra note 40 (statement of Steve Levine,
Author: Oil and Glory: The Pursuit of Empire and Fortune on the Caspian Sea, Former
Foreign Correspondent, The Wall Street Journal).
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played out through the establishment of pipelines.2 18 Oil and gas
pipelines are the lifelines for Central Asia, connecting the region
to the larger global economy.219 The following chapter outlines
the available pipeline options and the political implications of
each.
A. Pipeline Options
There are four general routes which a pipeline, either gas or
oil, can follow through Central Asia. 2 20  The first is the most
common route of the existing pipelines north through Russia to
ports along the Black Sea or into Russia's pipeline system.2 2 1 The
second is the western route through Turkey, either over the
Caucasus Mountains or via the Caspian Sea.222 Both routes raise
security problems and the cost of building any pipeline along this
these routes is extreme.223 The shortest path is south through Iran,
a route less than ideal for the United States and most Western
energy investors. 224 The eastern path to China is not only very
expensive, but it would also mean any exports would go
exclusively to China. 225 The last option is likely to be the most
desirable for the United States: a Southeastern path through
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.22 6 Unfortunately, due to the
ongoing war in Afghanistan, this path is also a high security risk.
Oil pipelines are most common in Central Asia. There are
currently eight major pipelines and barge routes:
* Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC): This line is transporting
218 Auyezov, supra note 203.
219 See Energy Profile ofKazakhstan, supra note 189.
220 See Hearing on U.S. Interests in the Central Asian Republics Before the
Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 105th
Cong. 18-20 (1998) [hereinafter Hearing on U.S. Interests in the Central Asian
Republics] (statement of John J. Maresca, Vice President of International Relations,
Unocal Corporation), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa48119.000/hfa48119_0.htm#0.
221 See id. at 18.
222 See id.
223 See id. at 19.
224 See id.
225 See Hearing on U.S. Interests in the Central Asian Republics, supra note 220, at
19.
226 See id. at 20.
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oil at over one million bbl/day from the Azeri coast of
the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean coast of
Turkey.227 The shareholders of this pipeline include
British Petroleum (BP), the majority shareholder,
Unocal, and ConocoPhillips.2 28
* Baku-Novorossiysk/ Baku-Supsa: The first pipeline
runs from the Azeri coast of the Caspian to the Black
Sea port of Novorossiysk. 229 It has a capacity of
100,000 bbl/day. Baku-Supsa carries approximately
145,000 bbl/day and runs from Azerbaijan to the
Georgian Black Sea port of Supsa.230 Compared to the
majority of the other existing pipelines, it carries small
amounts of oil.231
* Atrayu-Samara: This Russian owned line transports
oil from Atyrau, Kazakhstan to Samara, Russia. 232
Kazakhstan has pledged to export 340,000 bbl/day, but
Russia has pledged to increase this to 500,000
bbl/day.2 33
* Kazakhstan-China: The newest pipeline begins in
Kazakhstan's Aktyubinsk oil fields and continues into
Atrayu.234 This is the first stage of the pipeline and was
completed in 2003.. 235 The second phase was
completed in 2006. 236 It will carry approximately
227 See Table 4: Oil Export Routs and Options in the Caspian Sea Region, CASPIAN
SEA REGION: RESERVES AND PIPELINES TABLES (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.angelfire.com/dragon/asif/CaspianSea-Region.htm.
228 See Mark Tran, Q&A: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, GUARDIAN.CO.UK
(May 26, 2005, 4:38 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2005/may/26/businessqandas.oilandpetrol.
229 See Table 4: Oil Export Routes and Options in the Caspian Sea Region, supra
note 227.
230 See id.
231 See id.
232 See id.
233 See EIA Kazakhstan Oil, supra note 180.
234 See Table 4: Oil Export Routes and Options in the Caspian Sea Region, supra
note 227.
235 See EJA Kazakhstan Oil, supra note 180.
236 See id.
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400,000 bbl/day to 800,000 bbl/day23 7 and its funding is
guaranteed by China.238
* Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC): Owned and
operated by a consortium of Western oil companies,
this line runs from Kazakhstan's Tengiz oil field to
Novorossiysk. 239 It currently carries 565,000
bbl/day.2 40
* Barge Routes:
o Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan: This is a new
agreement between the two aforementioned
countries that each year Kazakhstan will
transport 733 million barrels to the BTC
pipeline via barge.24 1
o Turkmenistan-Iran: a swap agreement 242
between Iran and Turkmenistan where Iran
refines and transports the Turkmen oil to its
Persian Gulf port of Neka via barge.24 3 Iran is
hoping to make many other swap agreements
with its neighbors.2 44
There are two major pipelines currently in the planning stages:
the Trans-Caspian pipeline and the Central Asia Oil Pipeline
237 See Table 4: Oil Export Routes and Options in the Caspian Sea Region, supra
note 227.
238 Jay Nathan, Kazakhstan's Oil Supply Chain Management Challenges,
ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/186785393 2.html.
239 See EIA Kazakhstan Oil, supra note 180.
240 See Table 4: Oil Export Routes and Options in the Caspian Sea Region, supra
note 227.
241 Ariel Cohen, U.S. Interests and Central Asia Energy Security, 1984
BACKGROUNDER, Nov. 15, 2006, at 1, 3, available at
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/11895.pdf [hereinafter Cohen].
242 Swap agreements consist of transactions between two parties where one party
exchanges use of a possessed commodity for the use of a commodity owned by the other
party. Swap Agreement (Bankruptcy) Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL (last visited
Feb. 14, 2011), http://definitions.uslegal.com/s/swap-agreement-bankruptcy/.
243 See Cohen, supra note 241, at 4.
244 See Robert M. Cutler, Russia Begins Oil Swaps With Iran, CENTRAL ASIA-
CAUCASUS INSTITUTE ANALYST (Mar. 12, 2003),
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/287 (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
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(CAOP). 245 The Trans-Caspian would transport oil from
Kazakhstan's Kashagan oil project to Baku, where it will be fed
into the BTC pipeline.2 4 6 The Kashagan oil field was projected to
be fully operational by 2012.247 The CAOP is the most desirable
transport option for the United States.248 This line would transport
oil from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan, into Pakistan where it
would be exported out of the port of Gwadar on the Arabian
Sea. 249 All three countries signed a Memorandum of
Understanding in 2002. 250 Due to the continued unrest in
Afghanistan, and the now growing issues in Pakistan, the project
has been delayed several times.25 '
The network of natural gas pipelines in Central Asia is almost
wholly owned and controlled by Russia's Gazprom. 252 The
existing lines are as follows:
* Central Asia Center Pipeline: Built in 1974, this line
has two branches. 253  The western branch brings gas
from Turkmenistan's Caspian Sea coastline north
where it intersects with the eastern branch in western
Kazakhstan.254 The eastern branch brings gas from
eastern Turkmenistan and southern Uzbekistan, across
245 See Table 4: Oil Export Routes and Options in the Caspian Sea Region, supra
note 227.
246 See Trans-Caspian Oil Pipeline Moves Closer, 236 PIPELINE & GAS J. 16 (Jul.
2009), http://pipelineandgasjoumal.com/trans-caspian-oil-pipeline-moves-closer.
247 See Kadyr Toktogulov, Update: Kashagan Phase I To Be 72% Complete By End
09- NCOC, Dow JONES NEWSWIRES, Sep. 24, 2009,
http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/company-news-story.aspx?storyid=20090924075 1 dowjone
sdjonline000380.
248 See Hearing on U.S. Interests in the Central Asian Republics, supra note 220, at
17-20.
249 See Energy Profile of Central Asia, supra note 161; THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
EARTH (Sept. 4, 2008),
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energyjprofile-of CentralAsia#Turkmenistan.27sOil_
Sector.
250 See Afghan Pipeline Given Go-Ahead, BBC NEWS (May 30, 2002),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2017044.stm.
251 See id.
252 See Energy Profile of Central Asia, supra note 161.
253 See id.
254 See id.
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Uzbekistan to western Kazakhstan. 25 5 The two pipes
combine and then continue on directly north into
Russia's pipeline system. 25 6 The line has a capacity of
3.53 tcu [trillion cubic units], the majority of which is
provided by Turkmenistan.2 57
* Korpedzhe-Kurt-Kui: Built in 1997, this was the first
non-Russian natural gas pipeline within the CIS. 258
With a capacity of approximately 300 bcf per year, this
line transports Turkmen gas into Iran.25 9
* Tashkent-Bishkek-Almaty: Another Russian owned
line, it carries gas from Uzbekistan into Southern
Kazakhstan at a capacity of 777 bcf.2 6 0 It also delivers
gas to Kyrgyzstan.26 1 In fact, it is Kyrgyzstan's main
source of natural gas.262 In the past ten years, conflicts
between the three neighbors have led to Uzbekistan
cutting off the supply, as well as numerous instances of
the line being illegally tapped by Kyrgyzstan.26 3
While the natural gas infrastructure looks bleak, there are two
shining beacons of hope in Central Asia. One is the South
Caucasus Pipeline, also known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum
line.264 It was completed and became operational in 2006, with a
capacity of seven bcf per year.265 It runs from Azerbaijan into
Georgia, parallel to the BTC from the Azeri gas field of Shah
Deniz.2 66 The Nabucco line, which will eventually link to the
255 See id.
256 See id.
257 See Energy Profile of Central Asia, supra note 161.
258 See id.
259 See id.
260 See Cohen, supra note 241, at 5.
261 See id.
262 See Energy Profile of Central Asia, supra note 161.
263 Id.
264 See Georgia - Oil & Gas Politics, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/georgialoil-politics.htm (last updated Mar.
2, 2010).
265 See South Caucasus Pipeline, BRITISH PETROLEUM,
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryld=9006670&contentld=7015095
(last visited Nov. 9, 2010).
266 See id.
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South Caucasus pipeline, is the European Union's major energy
project. 267 It will bring Central Asian and Caucasian energy
sources into the European Union through Turkey, the Balkans, and
then into Central Europe and Austria. 268 Although initial
discussions and planning for the project began in 2002, it was not
until February 2008 that the Nabucco Consortium gained its sixth
partner.26 ' The current projected start date for construction is
2012, with completion expected by 2015.270
The second line is the Trans-Afghan Pipeline, also known as
the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) Pipeline.2 71 It has
gone through the agreement and planning stages, but is not yet
under construction.m Similar to the CAOP, the TAP line will
transport natural gas from Turkmenistan into Afghanistan and onto
the port of Fazika, which is located on the Indian-Pakistani
border.27 3 It has a planned capacity of 1.1 bcf per year.27 4
Central Asia is the final frontier of undeveloped reserves as far
as natural gas and oil are concerned. There is none left to be
found, and the world's consumption of both natural resources is
only increasing. 275 Fueled by the growing international concern
with global warming, natural gas is seen as the best alternative to
coal and petroleum. 276 This is not to say, however, that the
267 See Energy Supremo: Nabucco Pipeline Is Best European Solution, SOFIA NEWS
AGENCY (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.novinite.com/view news.php?id=1 13554.
268 See Route, NABUCCO GAS PIPELINE,
http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/pipeline/route (last visited Feb.
7,2011).
269 About Us, NABUCCO GAS PIPELINE,
http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/companymain/about-us (last
visited Feb. 7, 2011).
270 Timeline, NABUCCO GAS PIPELINE,
http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/pipeline/timeline steps (last
visited Feb. 7, 2010).
271 See Energy Profile of Central Asia, supra note 161.
272 See id.
273 See id.
274 See id.
275 See Int'l Energy Outlook 2009, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 1-3 (May 2009),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiafarchive/aeo09/pdf/0383(2009).pdf.
276 See id. at 35.
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world's consumption of oil has decreased or slowed in any way.27 7
To meet the increase in natural gas consumption, production in
Central Asia is projected to increase by 22 million barrels per day
from 2003-2015.278 The global market is characterized by rising
prices, increasing consumption, non-OPEC supply growth, and an
ever-stronger demand for OPEC oil.
The kind of natural resource wealth found in Central Asia will
not go undeveloped, and the Newly Independent States279 will not
be left to unravel the mess that is their economy on their own.280
The states themselves are wracked with internal conflict and
questionable leaders, while the people of Central Asia see very
little of the money gained from their land's natural resources.28 1
How this region is developed is also of great concern to the
international community. Central Asia needs structure and
guidance to prevent the region from falling victim to the same fate
of many other resource rich regions. International law has taken
steps to attempt to provide a safety net.
VI. The Energy Charter Treaty: A Multilateral Way to Even
the Playing Field or Another Instrument of Destruction?
A. Introduction
The Energy Charter Treaty is an idea born from a heated
political argument during which the Prime Minister of the
Netherlands suggested that economic recovery in the Eastern
European and Central Asian states could be "catalyzed and
accelerated by cooperation in the energy sector."282 Negotiations
forming the Charter ended in 1991, and it was formally adopted
that December at the Hague Convention for the European Energy
Charter Treaty (ECT).28 3 By the end of the convention, all original
277 See id. at 21.
278 See id.
279 A common nickname for all the newly sovereign states created at the fall of the
USSR.
280 See KLEVEMAN, supra note 9, at 89 ("No other problem poses a greater threat of
engulfing the Caspian region-and with it the rivaling external powers-in conflict than the
ultimate fate of the pipelines.").
281 Id. at 1-10.
282 Wllde & Dorian, supra note 43, at 1.
283 See id.
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charter signatories signed the ECT, including all former republics
of the USSR (Central Asia and Slavic countries) and Russia.28 4
The purpose of the ECT is defined in Article IV of its charter:
"[t]o establish a legal framework in order to promote long-term
cooperation in the energy field based on complimentary and
mutual benefits in accordance with the objectives and principals of
the charter."285 The ECT is a jigsaw puzzle of other multilateral
frameworks. As a bi-product of the General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs, the World Trade Organization, and bilateral
investment treaties, on the whole, the ECT seeks to incorporate all
the strengths of these organizations while avoiding their
weaknesses.28 6
B. Development of the Energy Charter Treaty
1. The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
As the world's dependence on oil and gas increases, every
sovereign nation has an interest in energy security. Historically,
steps have been taken to establish a legal framework under which
global energy security can be reached .28  As part of a larger plan
for economic recovery post-World War II, the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was created and signed in 1947.288
The GATT, a predecessor of both the World Trade Organization
and the Energy Charter Treaty, was designed to reduce tariff
barriers that had been created during the World Wars. 28 9 "The
collapse of international trade in the 1930s and its effects on peace
and war led some world leaders to conclude that new international
economic institutions were essential." 29 0 As such, the GATT was
originally drafted as a simple trade agreement including only what
284 See id. at 1-2.
285 Id. at 2.
286 Id.
287 See Philip Andrews-Speed, The Politics of Petroleum and the Energy Charter
Treaty as an Effective Investment Regime, 4J. ENERGY FIN. &DEv. 117, 117-35 (1999).
288 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 UNTS 194
[hereinafter GATT].
289 See JoHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GATT AND THE WTO 38
(2000) [hereinafter JACKSON].
290 Id. at 21.
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was necessary "to protect the value of tariff concessions."2 9 1
The idea behind the GATT was that if tariffs on exports and
imports could be controlled, international trade would restart
itself.29 2 Essential to the agreement was the idea of trade without
discrimination. 293 This meant that when a GATT member and its
trading partners agreed on a certain tariff reduction, that deal was
automatically extended to all other GATT members.2 94 Originally,
the GATT was only meant to be an interim instrument that would
later be replaced by a more substantial international regime.295
The GATT was not replaced, and in fact it survived and expanded
until the World Trade Organization (WTO) replaced it in 1995.296
However, though the GATT as its own agreement no longer exists,
the regime lives on in two different forms; both the ECT and the
WTO have adopted the GATT's crucial principal of trade without
discrimination.29 7
Beyond adopting a nondiscrimination trade regime, the ECT
shows great deference to the former establishment of the GATT.
Article 29 subjects all members to the provisions of the GATT.29 8
This article governs all trade between any two members where
either one or both are not GATT members.2 99 Mirroring many of
the provisions of the GATT, Article 29 establishes that all
members will report and regulate tariff prices.3 00
2. The Hull Rule and the CT Article 13
The history of international relations contains many tales of
expropriation of alien-owned property. Recently, the ability of
291 Id. at 23.
292 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), supra note 288.
293 See id.
294 See id.
295 See JACKSON, supra note 289, at 17-18.
296 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), supra note 288; The
GA TT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (last visited
Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatise/tif e/fact4_e.htm.
297 See id. See also Wilde & Dorian, supra note 43, at 39.
298 See The Energy Charter Treaty, art. 29, Dec. 17, 1994, available at
http://www.ena.It/pdfai/Treaty.pdf [hereinafter Energy Charter Treaty].
299 Id.
300 Id.
2011] 453
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
states to expropriate the property of foreign investors has been
hotly debated in the realm of international law.30' The USSR
expropriated all of Central Asia and a significant portion of
Eastern Europe during World War I. "Since World War II ...
significant expropriations of alien-owned property had a more
deliberative and pervasive character, reflecting less transitory
passions than relatively long-range efforts to wrest local wealth
from foreign hands and to develop economies which gave larger
roles to the public sector." 30 2
As the focus shifted away from empire building and
acquisition into state responsibility, domestic laws became one of
the standards by which relations between sovereign states could be
judged." The Hull Rule is one such rule, which is the long-
accepted principle requiring proper compensation in the event of
expropriation.3 04 Between 1915 and 1940, Mexico expropriated
land owned by the United States.30 s U.S. nationals who were
affected by this taking sought compensation for their loss.30 ' "The
controversy led to a series of diplomatic notes in which the two
governments set forth their positions on the question of
compensation" for taken property.3 07 In a note dated August 22,
1938, United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull set the
standard for expropriation compensation:
The Government of the United States merely adverts to a
self-evident fact when it notes that the applicable
precedents and recognized authorities on international law
support its declaration that, under every rule of law and
equity, no government is entitled to expropriate private
property, for whatever purpose, without provision for
prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefore [sic]. In
301 Wllde & Dorian, supra note 43, at 365.
302 HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIAL AND
TEXT 479 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter STEINER ET AL.].
303 See id. at 480 ("Claims of expropriated parties for compensation rest on the
premise that most national laws as well as international law recognize and protect
interests of private parties in productive tangible and intangible assets.").
304 IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 140-44 (1998).
305 See id.
306 See id.
307 STEINER ET AL., supra note 302, at 488.
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addition, clauses appearing in the constitutions of almost
all nations today, and in particular in the constitutions of
the American republics embody the principle of just
compensation. "
The Hull rule of "prompt, adequate, and effective" payment is
the standard of compensation in the event of expropriation.3 09
Expropriation is covered in Article 13 of the ECT.310 The basic
formula disallows nationals of one member state in the territory of
another member state to have their property expropriated unless it
is:
(a) For a purpose which is in the public interest;
(b) Not discriminatory;
(c) Carried out under due process of law; and
(d) Accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and
effective compensation."
The ECT takes the Hull rule beyond its traditional definitions
and defines compensation under Article 13, section (d) as being an
''amount to the fair market value of the investment expropriated at
the time immediately before the expropriation" and as due on the
date of expropriation.3 12
One of the most frequent types of expropriation is
nationalization. Article 13(1) includes nationalization in its
definition of "expropriation."'1 The original Hull formula does
not extend as far as the ECT has extended it. However,
considering the amount of investment occurring throughout the
member states of the ECT, especially Central Asia, nationalization
is a very real issue. In general, remedies offered by the ECT in the
event of expropriation are defined in Article 13(2), which "gives
308 Id. at 491.
309 Walde & Dorian, supra note 43, at 365. During the 1970's, the Hull rule was
made null and void during the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on a "New
International Economic Order." Id. The UNGA passed a resolution stating that states
expropriating foreign property within their own borders were free to decide the amount
of proper compensation, as well as the method of payment, and that any dispute arising
from such decisions should be settled within the state itself. GA Res. 3171 (XXVIII),
UN GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, UN Doc. A/9030, at 52 (Dec. 17, 1973).
310 See WAlde & Dorian, supra note 43, at 633-34.
311 See id. at 367.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 367.
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the investor the right, but not the obligation, to seek prompt
review" of both the legality of the expropriation and the value
assigned it by the host government.3 14 The foreign investor is not
required to seek remedy within the host government's national
legislation unless the dispute is over taxing.
This definition of expropriation is especially critical for
foreign investors building transit pipelines for oil and gas. The
land that they purchase and build stretches over thousands of miles
and across borders. The value of development to that land is often
in the billions of dollars. The ECT's. ability to offer a well-defined
rule of law that enforces the loss of such a development will
encourage investors to choose development projects in ECT
member territories as opposed to non-ECT member territories.
Unfortunately, the ECT offers no such guarantee to foreign
investors. Of major concern is the ambiguity of Article 18
concerning member states' sovereignty over energy resources.3 16
Article 18(1) states that "the Contracting parties recognize state
sovereignty and sovereign rights over energy resources. They
reaffirm that these must be exercised in accordance with and
subject to the rules of international law."3 " The Article goes on to
define the rights left to host states in determining the availability,
exploration, and exploitation of the natural resources held within
their borders.3 " The Article is extremely vague and offers little in
the way of standards by which foreign investors can hold host
governments accountable. Furthermore, it is not well tied into the
rest of the charter's articles.
C. The Structure of the ECT
In general, the charter is designed "to promote access to
international markets on commercial terms .. . to develop an open
314 Id. at 368.
315 Walde & Dorian, see supra note 43, at 368; see also Article 21(5)(b) of the
Energy Charter Treaty, which requires that any expropriation disputes believed to be as a
result of a taxation issue within the host government be resolved within the host territory.
The entirety of Article 21 is aimed at upholding the sovereign right of member states to
control their own tax policies. See id. at 640-41.
316 See id. at 637.
317 Id.
318 See id.
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and competitive market."31 9 More specifically, the ECT aims to
achieve:
(1) Investment protection (e.g. by granting investors non-
discriminatory treatment); (2) National Treatment and
Most-Favored Nation Treatment; (3) compensation in case
of expropriation and other losses; (4) free transfer of
capital; (5) trade in energy, energy products and energy
related equipment, based on the WTO rules; (6) freedom of
energy transit; (7) improvement of energy efficiency;
(8)international dispute settlement, including investor-state
arbitration and inter-state arbitration; and (9) improved
legal transparency.32 0
The structure of the ECT is divided between "hard" and "soft"
laws.32 1 Most of the treaty's rights and requirements are "hard
law" and are enforceable through arbitration.3 2 2 There are also
several practices encouraged by the treaty that are considered "soft
law."3 23 The "soft laws" tend to be good practices or behaviors
that the ECT seeks to encourage among its members.
As has been previously discussed, the ECT is a multilateral
treaty born out of several other establishments of international
law.324 Most significant among those is the GATT. The ECT is
considered to take a "GATT-plus" approach, enforcing not only
the GATT structure, but also additional requirements that extend
the GATT into non-GATT countries.325 There are three major
focal points of the Energy Charter Treaty: trade, transit, and
dispute resolution. 326 The GATT's fingerprint is visible
throughout all three areas.
319 Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 298, art. 3.
320 SANAM S. HAGHIGHI, ENERGY SECURITY: THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION WITH MAJOR OIL AND GAS SUPPLYING COUNTRIES 193 (2007)
[hereinafter HAGHIGHI].
321 Walde & Dorian, supra note 43, at 2.
322 Id.
323 Id. ECT Article 7(2) is an example of a "soft law" obligation because it seeks to
"'encourage relevant entities to co-operate' in modernizing, developing, operating, and
facilitating the interconnection of 'Energy Transport Facilities."' Id. at 7.
324 The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 298, pmbl.
325 Wilde & Dorian, supra note 43, at 3.
326 Id.
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1. Trade
As a "grandchild" of the GATT, the ECT seeks to promote
East-West industrial cooperation by providing legal safeguards in
areas such as investment, trade, and transit.327 Trade obligations
under the ECT are identified in Article 5.328 The article is very
specific. It states that "a Contracting party shall not apply any
trade-related investment measure that is inconsistent with the
provisions of Article III or XI of the GATT."32 9 There are no
exceptions for domestic laws or administrative rulings.33 0 The
importance given to trade in the ECT is significant considering
that "petroleum alone is considered as the single most important
commodity both in value and volume terms, traded
internationally. . ."3 3 1 If the ECT hopes to successfully extend the
rules of the GATT into the energy sector, trade must be addressed.
However, other than the provisions created specifically for the
energy sector, the ECT generally adopts the rules already set out
by the GATT and the WTO.3 32
Most-favored nation (MFN) treatment is one of the key
principles set out by both the WTO and the GATT."' It is defined
as a principle of international economic trade, which grants the
same status to one nation that is granted to all other nations.33 4 For
example, all WTO members treat all other WTO members as
MFN trading partners. 33 "By applying government trade
restrictions uniformly, without regard for the origin of goods, the
market system of allocation of goods and production will have the
maximum effect."" Such a system decreases the development of
trade cliques as well as the amount of special treatment given to
327 Wllde & Dorian, supra note 43, at 445.
328 The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 298, art. 5.
329 Id. art. 5(1).
330 See id. art. 5(2).
331 HAGHIGHI, supra note 320.
332 See id. at 239.
333 See WTO.org, Understanding the WTO - principles of the trading system,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/theWTOe/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm, (last
visited on Nov. 14, 2009) [hereinafter WTO].
334 See JACKSON, supra note 289, at 58.
335 See WTO, supra note 333.
336 JACKSON, supra note 289, at 60.
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certain partners over others. In general, it decreases the
competitive tensions created by an "open-market." , 7 The ECT's
Article 4 and Article 5 work in accordance with the GATT/ WTO
principles to all signatories. 33 For signatories to the GATT,
Article 4 ensures that no provision of the ECT will interfere with
obligations outlined by the GATT. " For non-GATT/WTO
members, Article 29 of the ECT imports GATT-related rights and
obligations in the ECT to apply only while "any contracting party
is not a party to the GATT and Related Instruments."3 40  The
application of Article 29 ends when a signatory of the ECT
becomes a member of the WTO.3 41 The effect of the combination
of ECT Articles 4, 5 and 29 is that every signatory of the ECT is
subject to the provisions of the GATT and the WTO.
Article 29(2)(b) articulates an exception for the nations of
Central Asia. 342 The provisions of Annex TFU govern trade
agreements between these nations only.3 43 "Compliance with that
annex is also a precondition to benefit from the exception,"
ensuring that some degree of regulation is enforced. 344
2. Transit
Transit of materials is one of the most, if not the most,
important subjects in discussing the international energy sector.
Freedom of transit across the territory of another state in the
interest of the community of nations has been a recognized
concept in international law since the seventeenth century.3 45 "The
existing ECT transit provisions oblige its Contracting Parties to
facilitate the transit of energy on a non-discriminatory basis
consistent with the principle of freedom of transit."3 4 6 In contrast
337 Id.
338 See The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 298, art. 4, 5.
339 See id. at art. 4.
340 Id. at art. 29(1).
341 See W51de & Dorian, supra note 43, at 465.
342 See The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 298, art. 29 (2)(b).
343 See Waide & Dorian, supra note 43, at 467. See The Energy Charter Treaty,
supra note 298, at Annex TFU.
344 Walde & Dorian, supra note 43, at 467.
345 See id. at 499.
346 See Andrei Konoplyanik & Thomas Walde, The Energy Charter Treaty and its
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to this is the right of territorial sovereignty. This right allows
nations to prevent the construction of devices for transit within
their territory.3 47 Freedom of transit is particularly important for
signatories like Kazakhstan, which "does not have access to a
seaport."3 48 Kazakhstan, like all of the Central Asian members,
must rely on the continued hospitality of Russia in order to export
its resources to other markets. Any dispute between Russia and
the members of the CIS could result in "Russia simply cutting off
pipeline access."3 49 The ECT provides a standard for transit and a
"dispute-resolution mechanism" to enforce it.350
Transit under the ECT regime has three major goals: (1) to
establish an open-ended obligation to favor construction of new
facilities; (2) to abstain from the unwarranted closure of existing
transit facilities as a result of political motivations; and (3) to
make sure state and private transit operators do not undermine
their obligation to facilities. "' Article 7 of the ECT defines
"transit" as the following:
The carriage through the Area of a Contracting Party, or to
or from port facilities in its Area for loading or unloading,
of Energy Materials and products originating in the Area of
another state and destined for the Area of a third state, as
long as either the other state or third state is a contracting
party.352
The type of transit described is "through-transit" and while the
article seems to require the action of three parties, transit can be
achieved by two parties where one of the parties controls both the
origin and destination.353 One of the Russian Federation's biggest
objections to the Treaty is its assertion that the ECT imposes a
third-party access requirement for all energy trade agreements. 3 54
Role in International Energy, 24 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 523, 543 (2006)
[hereinafter Konoplyanik & W5lde].
347 Walde & Dorian, supra note 43, at 449-50.
348 Id. at 180.
349 Id.
350 Id.
351 See id. at 509-10.
352 The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 298, art. 7.
353 See Walde & Dorian, supra note 43, at 508.
354 See id. at 168.
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Such an obligation would open Russia's transport system to
cheaper resources from Central Asia and may create competition
for Russian gas and oil supplies in Europe.355 Considering the
abuse that the Central Asian states have endured from the Russian
Federation, this fear is not completely unfounded. 1 6 However, the
ECT does not imply any such requirement and specifically states
this in the ECT Understanding IV. 1 (b)(ii).3 57
3. Dispute Resolution
One of the biggest criticisms of international law is, generally,
that it cannot be enforced.358 The ECT is unique in its application
of an extensive dispute resolution system.35 9 Under the ECT, not
only are obligations enforced, but they are also imposed so as to
create as little interruption in the trade of energy as possible.3 60
Article 27 generally addresses dispute settlement between
parties. 36 1 The treaty covers two types of dispute settlement: state-
state arbitration and investor-state arbitration. 362 The treaty
expressly regulates certain categories of disputes: disputes
between parties to the treaty (governed by Article 27); disputes
between investors and host-governments (governed by Article 26);
transit disputes (Article 7.7). Disputes concerning competition
(Article 6) and environmental concerns (Article 19) are special
exceptions to the general arbitration guidelines.3 63 Finally, any
355 See Konoplyanik & Wllde, supra note 346, at 540.
356 See Nick Megoran, Revisiting the 'Pivot': The Influence of Halford Mackinder
on Analysis of Uzbekistan's International Relationships, 170 GEORG. J. 347, 348 (2004).
357 "The provisions of the Treaty do not oblige any Contracting party to introduce
mandatory third party access." The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 302,
Understanding IV (1)(b)(ii).
358 See MARTIN DIxON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1 (6b ed, 2007).
359 See Michael Belz, Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty:
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia and Improving Provisional Application in Multilateral
Treaties, 22 EMORY INT'L. REv. 729, 735 (2009) [hereinafter Belz]. "Beyond
encouraging 'long-term cooperation, the ECT aims to embolden the rule of law'
established in the treaty with a system of dispute resolution and arbitration." Id. at 735.
360 CRAIG BAMBERGER, ET.AL., THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY IN 2000: IN A NEW
PHASE CHAPTER FROM ENERGY LAW IN EUROPE I (Martha M. Roggenkamp, ed. 2000).
361 The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 298, art. 27.
362 Dispute Settlement, ENERGY CHARTER (Nov. 13, 2009),
http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=26 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement].
363 See id.
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party has three possible venues of arbitration: the International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an ad
hoc committee of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITL), and the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC).3 *
This extensive system was designed partially in response to the
GATT's lack of "teeth."3 65 Ideally, the ECT's arbitration system
would level the playing field among parties in energy related
investments and trade. Success is dependent on the role that the
courts of arbitration choose to play. Many of the ECT's
arbitration provisions are vague or weak. Depending on the
interpretation of such articles by arbitration courts, the results
could only perpetuate the power-oriented geopolitical system as
opposed to creating a rule-oriented system.3 6 6 The following two
cases illustrate how key the role of arbitration courts are to the
implementation of the ECT.
a. Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan367
In February 1998, Petrobart Limited, a natural gas supply
company registered in Gibraltar, entered a contract with the
Kyrgyzgazmuniazat (KGM) for the supply and delivery of
200,000 tons of gas condensate.36 8 KGM is a natural gas supply
company that manages the majority of Kyrgyzstan's natural gas
supply. The Kyrgyzstan government owns more than 90 percent
of the company's stock.369 Petrobart brought the arbitration to the
SCC in 2003. KGM failed to deliver three separate payments
364 The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 298, art. 26(2), 26(4).
365 Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries and the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade/WTO Dispute Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719,721
(2004).
366 See id. at 721-22.
367 Pertrobart Ltd. (Gibraltar) v. Kyrgyzstan, SCC Arbitration No. 126/2003 (2003),
Energy Charter (Nov. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user-upload/document/Petrobart.pdf [hereinafter
Pertrobart Ltd. (Gibraltar) v. Kyrgyzstan].
368 Pertrobart Ltd. (Gibraltar) v. Kyrgyzstan, SCC Arbitration No. 126/2003 (2003),
Energy Charter (Nov. 19, 2010),
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user-upload/document/Petrobart.pdf [hereinafter
Pertrobart Ltd. (Gibraltar) v. Kyrgyzstan].
369 See id. at 19.
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before declaring bankruptcy. 370 Petrobart claimed that KGM
violated Articles 10(1), 10(2), and 10(3) of the ECT and that
Petrobart was entitled to compensatory damages, lost profits, and
arbitration fees.37 ' The Republic of Kyrgyzstan responded with
the argument that the contract between Petrobart and KGM did not
fall under the ECT as an "investment" and that failure to pay
Petrobart was due to a "stabilization program" functionally in
compliance with Kyrgyz bankruptcy law, and therefore, it should
be exempted from enforcement of the ECT.3 72
In determining the proper award in this case, the arbitral body
of the SCC had to examine whether Petrobart could be regarded as
an investor that made an investment protected under the ECT.373
Article 1(6) states that an "investment" is any asset, "owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by an Investor. . ."37 The court
reasoned that international law requires that when there is a
dispute between parties who have entered into a treaty, the
definitions within that instrument are controlling.375 In this case,
the ECT was the controlling document; therefore, its definitions of
"investment" and "investor" must be applied.376 Of particular note
are Articles 1(4) and 1(5) in connection with Article 1(6)(f):
(4) "Energy Materials and Products" based on the
Harmonized System of Customs and the Combined
Nomenclature of the European Communities, means the
items included in Annex EM,
370 See id. at 8. Note that before being submitted to the SCC for arbitration, both the
local court of Bishkek and the UNCITRAL received this case. Both legal bodies
rendered an award for Petrobart. See British Institute of International and Comparative
Law (BIICL), Individual Case Summaries - Petrobart Limited v. the Kyrgyz Republic,
available at http://www.biicl.org/files/3912_2005-petrobart-v-kyrgyz-republic.pdf
(Jan. 20, 2011) [hereinafter BIICL].
371 See Pertrobart Ltd (Gibraltar), SCC Arbitration No. 126/2003, at 18.
372 Id. at 23. To deal with KGM's mounting debt the Kyrgyz Republic transferred
all of KGM's assets to two new State companies but the liabilities remained in KGM.
BIHCL, supra note 370, at 3.
373 See Pertrobart Ltd. (Gibraltar), SCC Arbitration No. 126/2003, at 69.
374 The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 298, art. 1(6).
375 See Pertrobart Ltd. (Gibraltar), SCC Arbitration No. 126/2003, at 69; see also
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 UNT.S 331, 8
I.L.M. 679 (1980) (provides the accepted good-faith rule for treaty interpretation).
376 Id.
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(5) "Economic Activity and the Energy Sector" means an
economic activity concerning the exploration, extraction,
refining, production, storage, land transport, transmission,
distribution, trade, marketing or sale of Energy materials or
products except those included in Annex NI or concerning
the distribution of heat to multiple premises. 37 7
Under these articles, the tribunal found that "a right conferred
by contract to undertake an economic activity concerning the sale
of gas condensate is an investment according to the Treaty. This
must also include the right to be paid for such sale." 7 Petrobart
was found to be an investor and its contract with KGM was found
to be an investment under the protection of the ECT.379
Investments under the ECT are entitled to "stable, equitable,
favorable and transparent conditions."3 " Article 10 of the ECT
outlines the specific treatment afforded investors.381 Petrobart
claimed that the steps taken after failing to pay for the contracted-
for gas condensate deliveries were in violation of Articles 10(1).382
The tribunal found that the Kyrgyz Republic's choice to move
assets from KGM to other state-owned companies was done to the
detriment of Petrobart and other investors to whom KGM owed
money.8 This type of action violated the requirement of "fair and
equitable treatment" outlined by the Treaty's Article 10.384 The
facts showed a deliberate move by the Kyrgyz government to
avoid paying its debts to Petrobart and other investors.
Ultimately, the court awarded compensatory damages to Petrobart
amounting to the balance due, but denied damages for lost profits
and fees. 386  Each party was responsible for its own costs of
377 The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 298, app. 1.
378 Pertrobart Ltd. (Gibraltar) v. Kyrgyzstan, supra note 368, at 72.
379 See id.
380 The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 298, at article 10(1).
381 Id.
382 BIICL, supra note 370, at 2.
383 See Pertrobart Ltd. (Gibraltar), SCC Arbitration No. 126/2003, at 76.
384 See BIlCL, supra note 370, at 4.
385 See id. at 6. The Tribunal found that assets of high value were transferred from
KGM to other companies and that if such a move had not been made, it may have been
possible for KGM to repay its debt to Petrobart. Id.
386 See Pertrobart Ltd. (Gibraltar), SCC Arbitration No. 126/2003, at 84, 87.
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arbitration."
This case illustrates that in some cases arbitral tribunals are
able and willing to enforce the ECT in a way that has tangible
consequences for host-governments who may seek to take
advantage of investors. Central Asia is a developing region with
little experience in geopolitics. Due to the paternalism of Russia
for the majority of Central Asian history, the governments of the
five CIS members have been exposed to little other than the
exploitative international relations of the "Great Game" and the
Cold War era. Enforcement of the ECT in these countries will
create a greater confidence in prospective investors. The greater
the variety of investors in Central Asia, the looser the grip of
power-players like Russia over the natural resources held within
these countries.
b. Yukos Universal Ltd. (UK-Isle of Man) v. Russian
Federation88
This investor-state dispute is a pending decision within the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, a forum accepted
by the WTO for international arbitration. It includes two of the
ECT's most controversial principals: expropriation and the option
of provisional application.3 89 It also illustrates how detrimental an
anemic ruling by the court of arbitration can be to the
establishment of the ECT as a legitimate instrument of
international law.
The majority shareholders of the Yukos Oil Company have
brought three parallel claims under the Energy Charter Treaty
against the Russian Federation for "wrongfully" expropriating
Yukos' main production unit, Yuganskneftgas.3 90 The Russian
Federation argues that the Energy Charter Treaty does not bind it
because it has not ratified it and only applies it provisionally.3 91
Article 45 governs provisional application of the ECT.392 The
definition of provisional application is vague, especially in terms
387 See Pertrobart Ltd. (Gibraltar), SCC Arbitration No. 126/2003, at 87.
388 Dispute Settlement, supra note 362.
389 Id.
390 See Belz, supra note 359, at 727.
391 Id. at 727-28.
392 The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 298, art. 45.
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of which principals are required and which are optional. In
general, "the extent to which provisional application grants legal
rights and imposes obligations on states is still developing in
international law, particularly through international arbitration."39 3
The ECT provides for provisional application of the whole treaty
upon signature so long as the provisional application is not in
contrast with domestic law.3 94 "Provisional application of the ECT
is a unique concept because it is a multilateral investment
treaty." ' The practice of provisional application is usually
associated with addressing an urgent international issue.3 96 There
are two separate issues that arise from this article. First, it
provides a potential loophole through which signatories can slip to
avoid certain provisions of the ECT. Second, this contradicts the
accepted international principle that signatories of international
treaties may not use their domestic laws as a justification for
violating their treaty obligations. ' The ECT encourages
provisional signatories that choose to do so to deliver a declaration
upon signing indicating that provisional application is in violation
of its domestic laws.3 98
In the pending case, the Russian Federation did not declare at
signing that its domestic laws were in contrast with the provisional
application of the ECT. 3 9 9  Therefore, the issue for the court
becomes whether or not the Russian Federation waived its right to
assert that provisional application conflicts with its domestic law
post-signature of the Treaty.4 00 If the arbitral court finds in favor
of the Russian Federation, the arbitral court will also be
relinquishing jurisdiction and Yukos Oil will have to find another
venue in which to seek remedy.40 1 If the arbitral court finds in
393 Belz, supra note 359, at 729.
394 See The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 298, art. 45(1).
395 See Belz, supra note 359, at 734.
396 See id.
397 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 25, May 23, 1969, 1155
UNT.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1980). See generally, The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note
298, art. 21 (permitting the ECT to make an exception for the domestic tax laws of
signatories).
398 See The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 298, at art. 45(2)(a).
399 See Dispute Settlement, supra note 362.
400 Belz, supra note 359, at 730.
401 See id.
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favor of Yukos Oil, it will be a signal to all member-states that
provisional application of the ECT is not without consequence.
The ECT seeks to create a level playing field of rules to be
governed by investors and states alike, thus decreasing the risks
that are inherent in energy-related investments and trade. 402
Allowing signatories to apply the ECT provisionally and then to
later assert that it is inconsistent with their domestic laws will not
only undermine the goal of the ECT, but it will also perpetuate the
common assertion that international law lacks the power of
domestic laws. 403 Legally, this will require any investor to bear
the burden of determining whether or not the provisional
application of the ECT is consistent with a state's domestic laws
before entering into a contract with that state. Geopolitically, it
will send a message to all signatories that have yet to ratify the
Treaty that there is no incentive to do so because it offers no
concrete protection against provisional application members.
VII. Predictions for the Future
With the dawn of a new decade comes the dawning of a new
age for Central Asia, possibly even a new age for the global
community. The ongoing war in the Middle East has spread the
U.S. military thin and tested the limits of the government's
coffers. 4" Russia's trade policy, leaving its neighbors with
somewhat of an imperial hangover, has pushed the Newly
Independent States to find investment alternatives. 405 At the
annual summit of the CIS held in October 2010, only six of the
eleven members attended.' The entire summit lasted for half an
hour and no representative spoke to any other representative. 4 07 It
seems that in the Second Transoceanic Era, "Russia has ended up
402 See id.
403 See id. at 745.
404 See Julian Borger, War on Terror Was A Mistake, Says Milliband, THE
GUARDIAN, 1 (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/jan/15/war-on-
terror-miliband.
405 See Anders Aslund, The Leader of the CIS is Lonely and Weak, Moscow TIMES
(Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-leader-of-the-cis-
is-lonely-and-weak/388309.html.
406 See id.
407 See id.
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the biggest loser."40 8
But their loss is China's gain.
Essentially China is taking advantage of its enormous cash
reserves and still growing market that is a magnet for
exporters to secure key positions in key economic areas.
China is basically buying up major energy assets in
distressed countries at knock-down prices for long-term
contracts and secures for itself not just energy flows but
key strategic advantages for years to come.409
On December 14, 2009, the Turkmenistan-China natural gas
pipeline began production, and is projected to transport up to 40
bcm per year by 2012.4'0 The route will also pick up and export
gas from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, re-routing even more
natural gas away from Russian lines.4 1' Furthermore, China is
lending Kazakhstan ten billion dollars in return for a minority
holding in Kazakhstan's state-run gas company, KazMunaiGaz.4 12
As China's market grows and its cash flow increases, its
investment in new Central Asian projects increases, while it also
pushes for the completion of existing projects.4 13
Russia will eventually push back on China's encroachment
into its "territory." Surrounded by "growing factions," Russia will
have to stake its claim in the Newly Independent States.4 14 Very
few have found the Russian embrace comfortable, and the
countries of Central Asia are still sore from the years of
suppression they suffered under the USSR. As the conflict in
Central Asia heats up, there must be a release valve to keep the
408 Vladimir Ryzhkov, Very Little to Celebrate, THE Moscow TIMES (Nov. 6, 2009),
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/very-little-to-celebrate/388949.html.
409 Stephen Blank, China's 'Peaceful 'Rise in Central Asia, 11 CENTRAL ASIA-
CAUCASUS INSTITUTE ANALYST 8, 9 (Apr. 22, 2009) [hereinafter China's 'Peaceful Rise'
In Central Asia].
410 See Bruce Pannier, China Ends Russia's Grip on Turkmen Gas, ASIA TIMES
ONLINE, (Dec. 16, 2009),
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ChinaBusiness/KL 1 6CbO 1.html.
411 See id.
412 See China's 'Peaceful Rise' in Central Asia, supra note 409, at 9.
413 Id.
414 Alex Anishyuk, Gazprom's First Half Profit Falls 48%, THE MOSCOw TIMES
(Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/gazproms-first-half-
profit-falls-48/389162.html.
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region from exploding. The Energy Charter Treaty has the ability
to act as that release valve.4 15 Whether it meets its potential as the
Central Asian safety net is entirely dependent on how strictly it is
enforced.4 16 The players of the "Great Game" have changed, as
has the chessboard on which it is played. The rules and
regulations dictating the "Game" need to change as well.
415 See Belz, supra note 359, at 744-45 ("The ECT seeks to strengthen the rule of
law on energy issues by creating a level playing field of rules to be observed by all
participating governments thus minimizing the risks associated with energy-related
investments and trade.").
416 See id. at 752.
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